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Problem, research strategy, and findings: Local jurisdictions in 36 US states have 
implemented Transferable Development Rights (TDR) programs to provide a market-based approach 
to preserving farmlands and open space while redirecting future development to targeted areas. 
Participation in TDR programs involves transaction costs which are costs over and above paying for 
TDR credits. Planners know little about the magnitude of transaction costs, who, if anyone, incurs a 
disproportionate share of these costs, or how transaction costs impact TDR participation. We estimated 
the magnitude and distribution of transaction costs incurred by participants in four county-wide TDR 
programs in Maryland, a TDR pioneer, by interviewing multiple participants in these programs. We 
found that total transaction costs were high and borne largely by private sector participants, although 
we excluded initial public-sector costs of establishing the programs. Total transaction costs ranged from 
13% to 21% of total TDR costs per transaction. Our findings were based on data reported by participants 
and may not be scalable; transaction costs, however, might deter landowners from participating in TDR 
programs, thus thwarting the land-use goals of planners. 
Takeaway for practice: Planners should work to reduce transaction costs by better constructing 
TDR programs and providing greater information on TDR sale prices and potential buyers and sellers. 
Lowering, and more fairly, distributing transaction costs will make the TDR program a more successful 
approach to achieving land-use goals and addressing the externalities arising from land-use markets. 
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Introduction 
Transferable Development Rights (TDR) programs in the United States are multi-objective 
policy instruments that planners implement to address a wide range of planning objectives. City, 
township, and county-level planners use these programs to preserve historic landmarks, protect 
ecologically sensitive lands and farmlands, prevent urban sprawl, and develop more compact urban 
areas. As of 2016, US local governments operated 254 TDR programs in 36 US States, most dating 
from the 1980s. TDR programs establish markets to trade and transfer ‘development rights’ translated 
into TDR credits between different areas, allowing planners to protect lands which they would 
otherwise need to buy. Landowners in ‘sending areas’ may sell development rights, calculated as TDR 
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credits, with prices set by the market. Developers may purchase and use those credits in ‘receiving 
areas’, which planners designate for development. The original landowners maintain the property rights, 
but forgo the development rights in perpetuity after selling them. TDR programs normally provide 
developers with an option to obtain extra density (bonus density) to develop beyond a specific permitted 
level in receiving areas. 
There are costs to operating and participating in TDR programs. Private parties participating in 
TDR programs - landowners and developers - incur ‘transaction costs’, over and above paying the sale 
prices for TDR credits set by the market; these include negotiating TDR sale prices, finalizing contracts, 
meeting administrative requirements, and collecting information on potential TDR buyers/sellers and 
TDR sale prices. Public parties - planners and program administrators - also incur transaction costs that 
include training staff, holding public TDR educational workshops, and reviewing TDR applications. 
TDR programs have not always been successful in achieving their preservation and development 
objectives; some researchers speculate that high transaction costs involved in operating and 
participating in these programs might be one of the reasons. High transaction costs can have 
considerable impacts on policy efficiency and equity and can discourage private parties from 
participating in TDR programs. We can find no studies in the planning literature which attempt to 
estimate the significance of the transaction costs associated with TDR programs. 
This paper addresses this gap by providing estimates of the magnitude of transaction costs 
incurred by different stakeholders involved in ‘operating’ and ‘participating’ in four county-wide TDR 
programs in Maryland, a pioneer in implementing TDR programs. Our goal is to highlight the 
significance and distribution of transaction costs of these TDR programs. We give a very brief overview 
of the literature on TDR programs and transaction costs and describe the methodology we used. We 
then present our estimates of transaction costs in the TDR programs we consider. We find that the 
transaction costs of operating/participating in TDR programs are sizeable and unevenly distributed 
among public and private parties. We also find that preparing a land survey and hiring intermediaries, 
such as brokers and land-use attorneys, are the most costly activities in operating/participating in TDR 
programs. 
 
Transferable Development Rights (TDR): Rationale, Application, and Associated Costs 
TDR programs are market-based instruments that planners have proposed as a solution to 
preserving open space, environmentally sensitive areas, agricultural land, and better managing 
development (Johnston & Madison, 1997; Linkous, 2016; Pfeffer & Lapping, 1994; Pruetz & Pruetz, 
2007; Shih & Chang, 2015). Figure 1 shows that TDR programs transfer development rights from 
sending areas to receiving areas. Planners implement these programs as an alternative to traditional 
regulatory instruments, such as zoning, subdivision regulations, and purchase of development rights 
(PDR) programs. TDR and PDR programs normally have similar policy objectives, but they use 
different approaches to achieve them. Local governments use PDR programs to purchase development 
rights in preservation areas, using public funds. TDR programs, in contrast, do not use public funds and 
instead let the development market pay to preserve land and purchase development rights from lands 
within designated areas. The TDR approach is similar to zoning - public-sector planners recommend 
which areas are to be developed and which are to be preserved. TDR programs, however, use market 
mechanisms to achieve greater efficiency than traditional regulatory instruments, allowing development 
rights to be ‘traded’ in a way that protects sensitive lands, reducing the preservation costs for local 
governments. Some researchers also argue that these programs achieve greater equity through these 
trades, as money flows from those who benefit from being allowed to develop to compensate those who 
have been prevented from developing fully the land that they own (Clinch & O'Neill, 2010; L. Janssen-
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Jansen, Spaans, & van der Veen, 2008; Pruetz, 2003). TDR programs are superior to traditional 
instruments like zoning where large benefits are conferred on those lucky enough to be zoned for 
development but there is no transfer of funds to compensate those whose land is zoned for preservation. 
 
Figure 1: Transferring TDR credits from sending areas to receiving areas 
 
 
Researchers usually consider the Coase theorem as the intellectual foundation of TDR programs 
(Wang, Tao, Wang, & Su, 2010). The Coase Theorem argues that, if transaction costs are negligible 
and property rights of any resource are clearly attributed, market transactions will lead to more efficient 
outcomes in dealing with externalities than public interventions through negotiation between parties. 
Most planning actions are designed to address externalities, the positive or negative impacts of an 
individual’s action on unrelated third parties. Allowing landowners to change agricultural or sensitive 
lands into residential areas, for example, normally creates costs to society (social costs) that are greater 
than the private costs developers incur. Developing land in areas where planners want development, in 
contrast, can create public benefits by, for example, creating dense and diverse neighborhoods where 
people can walk and use public transit; these public benefits are likely to be greater than the private 
benefits to developers. Economists refer to the former costs as external costs or negative externalities, 
and consider the latter benefits as external benefits or positive externalities. The Coase theorem asserts 
that it is not always necessary to regulate externalities with regulatory instruments like zoning if there 
is a possibility of creating a market for property rights (Clinch, O'Neill, & Russell, 2008; Micelli, 2002). 
Planners thus design TDR programs to assist in defining property rights and create a property-rights 
market, which can replace direct forms of public intervention protecting certain types of land uses or 
encouraging development in specific areas. 
The concept of TDR is not new. The 1916 New York City zoning ordinance gave rise to the 
concept of so-called ‘air rights’; previously New York City did not regulate the height of buildings. Lot 
owners were then permitted to sell their unused air rights (development potential) to adjacent lots under 
the proposed zoning. The owners of ‘sending’ parcels could earn a considerable profit from selling their 
development potential, and the owners of ‘receiving’ parcels could, after purchasing these rights, erect 
a building that exceeded the height that the zoning and density regulations would ordinarily allow. In 
1986, the New York City Planning Commission introduced a more elaborate density-transfer 
mechanism to protect landmarks by allowing the transfer of development rights to parcels several blocks 
away (Giordano, 1987). Grand Central Terminal, South Street Seaport, Old Slip, and Christ Church are 
some of the landmarks that sold and transferred their unused air rights to other areas in New York City. 
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Most US TDR programs, however, did not commence until the late 1970s and early 1980s (Danner, 
1997; Renard, 2007). 
As of 2016 only seven out of 36 states have more than 10 TDR programs (Pruetz, 2016). TDR 
programs are mainly located in the Northeast and in Florida, California, and Washington State. The 
Northeast region has almost 40% of all TDR programs in the US. At least 25 out of 36 US states, 
including Maryland, in which TDR programs are active, have adopted enabling legislation explicitly 
permitting local governments to adopt such programs (Nelson, Pruetz, & Woodruff, 2011). Eight other 
states have not enacted enabling legislation although they have active TDR programs at a local level 
with the relevant general planning powers delegated to lower levels of government, which have come 
to include TDR programs. State statutes vary (in the States with TDR enabling acts) from granting 
powers in brief subsections (e.g. Florida Statute’s Land Development Regulations) to lengthy 
statements of principles and procedures (e.g. Title 40 of New Jersey’s Code). In Florida, for example, 
the brief grant of power to local governments encourages the use of ‘innovative land development 
regulations’ including ‘provisions such as transfer of development rights’ as well as other planning 
instruments, but provides no detail on how any TDR program should operate. 
TDR programs involve a multi-step process (Shahab, Clinch, & O’Neill, 2017). The process 
starts when city, township, and county-level planners choose TDR programs to preserve specific lands. 
They normally allocate TDR credits to lands located in sending areas (e.g. 1 TDR per 5 acres) and 
specify the number of credits needed to build one unit of development in receiving areas (e.g. 3 TDR 
credits per dwelling unit). How planners allocate TDR credits to sending and receiving areas varies. 
Landowners in sending areas usually need to apply for TDR credits from the relevant local 
government’s planning department in order to participate in market trading and transfer. Table 1 shows 
that this step, which we refer to as the ‘TDR creation’ stage, consists of collecting information, hiring 
a land-use attorney, preparing a title report, applying for TDR credits, and reviewing the TDR 
application. Participating landowners can then find a TDR buyer (normally a developer), negotiate a 
price for credits, and receive a payment for selling the TDR credits. This step, which we refer to as the 
‘contracting’ stage, involves collecting information, hiring a broker, negotiating a TDR price, and 
preparing a contract. Developers can purchase TDR credits from landowners if they wish to develop 
beyond a specific permitted level in receiving areas. Developers usually need to submit purchased TDR 
credits to the planning department to use the bonus density arising from TDR credits in their 
development projects. This step, which we refer to as the ‘TDR-retirement’ stage, involves collecting 
information, recording the contracts in land records, applying the purchased TDR credits in 
development projects, and recording all relevant documents. We focus on only the three stages: creating 
TDR credits, contracting, and retiring TDR credits. We refer to these three stages together as TDR 
transactions.  
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Table 1: Three stages involved in operating/participating in TDR programs and their relevant activities and stakeholders involved 
Stages involved in 
operating/participating 
in TDR programs 
Main activities involved Main stakeholders involved 
TDR Creation 
Hiring a land-use attorney 
Preparing a title report 
Preparing a land survey 
Applying for TDR credits 
Reviewing TDR applications 
Landowners, program 
administrators, and 
intermediaries 
Contracting 
Finding a TDR seller/buyer 
Consulting with program administrators, land-use attorneys, 
and brokers 
Hiring a broker and paying a brokerage fee 
Negotiating a TDR price 
Preparing a contract 
Payment for TDR credits 
Landowners, 
developers, and 
intermediaries 
TDR Retirement 
Recording the contract in land record 
Applying the purchased TDR credits in development project 
Recording the transfer documents 
Developers and 
program 
administrators 
Adapted from Shahab et al. (2017) 
 
Operating and participating in TDR programs creates many transaction costs. Transaction costs, 
in simple terms, are all the costs involved in a transaction that are not directly related to the production 
of a product (Lai, 1994; McCann, Colby, Easter, Kasterine, & Kuperan, 2005). Some researchers claim 
that transaction costs in TDR programs may be very high (Bruening, 2008; Chomitz, 2004; L. B. 
Janssen-Jansen, 2008; Messer, 2007; Tripp & Dudek, 1989), in part, because these programs are not 
always easy to administer (Arendt, 2004). High transaction costs may arise from lengthy and time-
consuming negotiations over TDR prices, difficulties in finding and connecting potential sellers and 
buyers, and complex rules, requirements, and/or regulations. High transaction costs lower the incentives 
for different stakeholders to participate in the program and discourage potential transactions (Bruening, 
2008; Messer, 2007). 
Claims of high transaction costs in TDR programs, however, are not based on systematic research 
or empirical data. We have found no empirical research in the planning policy literature that measures 
the magnitude of transaction costs. Some researchers have attempted to calculate the magnitude of such 
costs in other policy areas, such as environmental, agricultural, and natural resource policies; 
researchers find that these costs vary widely across policies. Transaction costs have ranged from as low 
as 8% of water purchase costs for the California water bank (Howitt, 1994) to as high as 110% of the 
payment to farmers for wildlife enhancement scheme in the UK (Falconer & Saunders, 2002). Policy-
related transaction costs studies also find that such costs are normally not evenly distributed among the 
stakeholders involved in policy instruments (Coggan, Whitten, & Bennett, 2010; Shahab, Clinch, & 
O’Neill, 2018). 
Researchers have used different methodologies to collect data to measure transaction costs in 
different policy studies. McCann et al. (2005) list five different sources of information for such studies, 
including, 1) surveys or interviews of people and parties involved in a policy, 2) secondary data from 
other studies, 3) government reports, 4) financial reports, and 5) proposed budgets. Several studies have 
used interviews to measure the transaction costs of public policy instruments (Falconer & Saunders, 
2002; Fang, Easter, & Brezonik, 2005; Kuperan, Abdullah, Pomeroy, Genio, & Salamanca, 2008; 
McCann & Easter, 1999; Ofei-Mensah & Bennett, 2013), because other methods and databases are not 
always available. McCann et al. (2005) argue that surveys or interviews are often the only way to obtain 
information regarding policy-related transaction costs, although they are relatively more difficult and 
time-consuming. 
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TDR Programs in Maryland 
There are 13 county-wide TDR programs in Maryland, one of the highest numbers of executed 
TDR programs among the US states. Table 2 shows where county-level planners in Maryland have 
applied TDR programs to preserve mainly farmlands, natural resources, and the rural character of 
counties. As of 2008, TDR programs in Maryland had preserved over 80,000 acres or 61% of all 
agricultural lands protected by TDR transfers in the US, according to a national study conducted by 
American Farmland Trust (2008). Three programs out of the seven TDR programs in the US that have 
preserved more than 10,000 acres by 2008 are located in Maryland: Montgomery County, Calvert 
County, and Queen Anne’s County (Pruetz & Standridge, 2008). We selected four county-wide case 
studies of TDR programs in Maryland, including Calvert, Montgomery, St. Mary’s, and Charles 
Counties. Our approach - selecting TDR case studies from only one state - allowed us to minimize the 
contextual differences between the case studies, and facilitate the comparison of policy design and 
implementation, while keeping other components of the institutional environment constant, including 
legislation. These counties, however, were considerably different in population and distance from 
Washington D.C. Montgomery County, located north-west of Washington D.C., is the largest county, 
with a population almost three times that of the other three counties combined, resulting in a higher 
level of demand for development. 
 
Table 2: Characteristics of TDR programs in different counties of Maryland 
TDR Programmes Year Initiated 
County 
Population 
(2010) 
County Area 
(Sq. Miles) 
Acres 
Preserved 
(2016) 
Main Goals of the Program 
Calvert County 1978 88,737 213.15 14,700 Preserving the rural character  
Caroline County 1989 33,066 319.42 2,827 Preserving farmlands 
Carroll County 1992 167,134 447.60 - Protecting mineral resources 
Cecil County 2006 101,108 346.27 - Preserving natural resources 
Charles County 1992 146,551 457.75 5,274  Agricultural preservation 
Frederick County 2014 233,385 660.22 - Agricultural preservation 
Harford County 1982 244,826 437.09 - Preserving farmlands 
Howard County 1992 287,085 250.74 4,980  Preserving farmlands 
Montgomery County 1980 971,777 491.25 52,052 Agricultural preservation 
Queen Anne’s County 1987 47,798 371.91 28,230 Preserving farmlands 
St. Mary’s County 1990 105,151 357.18 4,107 Preserving natural resources and farmlands 
Talbot County 1990 37,782 268.54 580 Preserving rural character  
Wicomico County 2004 98,733 374.44 - Preserving farmlands 
Data sources: Maryland Department of Planning (2016); Pruetz (2016); Dehart and Etgen (2007); 
McConnell, Walls, and Kelly (2007); Pruetz and Standridge (2008); The Maryland State Data Center 
(2015) 
 
We considered many factors in selecting the county-wide TDR case studies, including the 
requirement that each have: 1) a number of TDR transactions or transfers; 2) a number of people who 
were involved in the programs; 3) programs that were initiated in different years/decades; 4) different 
levels of success - acres preserved through the program; and, 5) reasonably close proximity to each 
other so as to maximize the number of face-to-face interviews that the researchers could conduct and 
thereby minimize research costs. Table 3 shows that the four TDR case studies differ in their 
institutional design and arrangements, such as how they approached the location of sending and 
receiving areas, how they allocated TDR credits, and the main county departments involved in their 
TDR programs. Figure 2 shows that these four TDR case studies are located in reasonable proximity to 
each other. 
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Calvert County, located in southern Maryland, initiated its TDR Program, the first in Maryland, 
in 1978. This program allows rural to rural TDR transfers. Montgomery County initiated its TDR 
program in 1980 and allows TDR transfers from the farmlands in the western and northern parts of the 
county to more urbanized areas, close to Washington D.C., in the south of the county. Walls and 
McConnell (2007) and McConnell et al. (2007) consider Calvert and Montgomery TDR programs as 
successful in preserving lands specified for protection. Pruetz and Standridge (2008) also list these two 
programs among the top six TDR programs that have preserved the largest acreage in the US. St. Mary’s 
and Charles Counties are two neighboring counties, located in southern Maryland, which initiated their 
TDR programs in the 1990s. St. Mary’s County allows rural to rural TDR transfers. Charles County 
designated a development district in the north of the county, the areas closer to Washington, D.C., as a 
receiving area, while the rest of the county are sending areas. McConnell et al. (2007) and Dehart and 
Etgen (2007) conclude that St. Mary’s and Charles TDR programs have been comparatively less 
successful in land preservation. 
 
Table 3: Characteristics of Maryland TDR case studies 
TDR Programs Sending areas Receiving areas 
Acres in sending 
areas needed for 
creating one 
TDR credit 
No. of TDRs 
needed to build 
one unit in 
receiving areas 
Main County 
Departments Involved 
Calvert County 
Lands located in 
Rural Community 
District 
Lands located in 
Rural Community 
District 
1 5 Department of Planning & Zoning 
Montgomery 
County 
Farmlands in the 
west and north of 
county 
More urbanized 
areas in the south 
of county 
5 1 
Planning Department & 
Department of 
Economic Development 
St. Mary’s 
County 
Lands located in 
Rural Preservation 
District 
Entire county 3 1 Department of Land Use & Growth Management 
Charles County 
Entire county, 
except receiving 
areas 
Development 
district in the north 
of county 
3 1 
Department of Planning 
and Growth 
Management 
 
 
Figure 2: Four TDR case-study areas in the State of Maryland 
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Estimating Transaction Costs in Four Maryland TDR Programs 
We aimed to estimate the magnitude of transaction costs incurred by private and public parties 
involved in the four county-wide TDR programs in Maryland. We confined our estimates of transaction 
costs to the expenses of operating TDR programs and the expenses to the stakeholders arising from 
TDR transfers. Only the public sector (the program administrators of each county) bears the transaction 
costs involved in operating these programs, while both the private (developers and landowners/farmers) 
and public sectors incur the costs involved in TDR transfers. We were unable to estimate transaction 
costs in the policy-design and establishment stage, largely because the TDR case-study programs were 
established a number of decades ago. 
One author (to ensure consistency) interviewed 46 representatives from different stakeholders 
involved in the TDR transactions across the four TDR case-study programs, including, 
landowners/farmers, developers, program administrators, and intermediaries such as land-use attorneys 
and brokers. Table 4 describes the number of interviews we conducted with different stakeholders in 
each TDR case-study program. We pre-tested our interview questions by undertaking two pilot 
interviews. From March to July 2016, we conducted semi-structured interviews on a face-to-face basis 
along with two telephone interviews. We digitally recorded and anonymously transcribed all of the 
interviews, which lasted from 45 to 90 minutes each. We first interviewed program administrators in 
each county. We informed the interviewees about the objectives of the study, the details of the 
interviews, and their voluntary and anonymous nature, prior to the interviews. 
We asked interviewees to explain the TDR transaction process from their own perspective and 
report the relevant activities they undertook and completed. We then asked a number of questions based 
on the participants’ experience and position. We finally asked interviewees, in line with snowball 
sampling, to recommend other potential interviewees and/or to provide information helpful for 
contacting other stakeholders. Snowball sampling allowed us to identify people who were information-
rich yet not easy to identify and contact. Table 5 outlines the questions we asked each type of 
stakeholder about the time they spent, and the costs they incurred, in each activity involved in TDR 
transactions. We also reviewed the government reports and administrative databases, such as recorded 
TDR prices, to complement the data collected from interviews. 
 
Table 4: Number of stakeholders interviewed in four Maryland counties 
Participants Landowners Developers Local Authorities Intermediaries Total 
Montgomery County 3 3 5 4 15 
Calvert County 2 2 5 2 11 
St. Mary’s County 2 2 4 4 12 
Charles County 2 2 2 2 8 
Total 46 
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Table 5: The interview questions we asked from different stakeholders 
Type of questions Questions 
Opening questions Briefly describe your experience of participating in the TDR program and the process you have gone through. 
Q
ue
st
io
ns
 fo
r d
iff
er
en
t s
ta
ke
ho
ld
er
s 
Landowners 
What had to be done in order to sell your required TDR? Could you please take me through the 
process step by step? 
How many hours/days did you spend on each activity? 
What was the cost of each hour you spent on each activity? 
Did you engage an intermediary to assist in the TDR transaction? If yes, how much did that 
intermediary cost? 
Developers 
What had to be done in order to buy your required TDR? Could you please take me through the 
process step by step? 
How many hours/days did you spend on each activity? 
What was the cost of each hour you spent on each activity? 
Did they engage an intermediary to assist in the TDR transaction? If yes, how much did that 
intermediary cost? 
Program 
administrators 
From receiving the initial TDR application until final transfer and contract, what has to be done in 
the administration of the TDR program? Could you please take me through the process step by step? 
How many people are involved in each activity? 
How many hours/days did you spend on each activity? 
What would be the total person hours involved in each activity? 
What would be the standard hourly rate (salary cost) for the staff involved in each activity? 
Intermediaries 
What had to be done in the process of a TDR transaction? Could you please take me through the 
process step by step? 
How much do you charge for carrying out each activity? 
What are the total costs of involving in this activity for a TDR seller/buyer? 
Closing questions 
Were there any other costs involved in each activity? 
What were the total costs of being involved in each activity? 
Would you be able to recommend other people (landowner, developer, intermediary, and program 
administrator) we could talk to about this? 
 
We calculated the total transaction costs of operating and participating in TDR programs as a 
sum of the time-related costs and direct monetary expenses (financial costs). We defined time-related 
costs as the dollar costs of time spent on each activity involved in TDR transactions. We estimated the 
time-related transaction costs involved in operating and participating in each TDR program for different 
stakeholders in three categories of activities: TDR creation, contracting, and TDR retirement. The direct 
monetary expenses, on the other hand, refer to all other direct financial costs involved in operating and 
participating in TDR programs, which are not time-related (Coggan, van Grieken, Boullier, & Jardi, 
2015). These costs include administration fees, brokerage fees, and the costs of preparing a land survey. 
We monetized time-related costs by multiplying the reported time inputs by the standard hourly 
rates for each category of stakeholders. Several other studies measuring transaction costs have used 
such an approach (Coggan et al., 2015; Falconer & Saunders, 2002; Fang et al., 2005; Kuperan et al., 
2008; McCann & Easter, 1999). We set the cost for program administrators at an average level of $45 
per hour, as reported by those we interviewed1. We assessed the standard value of time for Maryland 
farmers as $22.80 per hour. We calculated this rate based on the average net income per farm in 2015, 
i.e. $40,797 (Maryland State Archives, 2017), divided by the average annual hours actually worked per 
worker in the US in 2015, i.e. 1790 hours (OECD, 2017). We estimated the charges of land use attorneys 
at $400 per hour, based on the self-reported costs specified by interviewees. We set the costs for 
developers’ time at $100 per hour, using their self-reported rates. The considerable difference in the 
hourly rates attributed to the different stakeholders involved reflects their net added-value and, at least 
in part, recognizes how society places different values on the time of these various stakeholders 
(Falconer & Saunders, 2002). 
                                                    
1. This self-reported rate is consistent with the official salary data available as published in Report of County 
Employee Salaries, Health Benefits & Pensions - Fiscal Year 2016 (MACo, 2016). 
10 
 
 
Revealing Some of the Hidden Costs of TDR Programs 
We first present here our estimates of the total transaction costs involved in operating and 
participating in TDR programs in the four Maryland TDR programs. We then present the two 
components of these total costs, time-related and direct monetary transaction costs. We then discuss 
how estimated transaction costs are distributed between private and public sector actors involved in 
operating and participating in the TDR case-study programs. 
 
Total Transaction Costs 
We summed the total time-related costs and total direct monetary expenditures reported by our 
respondents to estimate total transaction costs for various stakeholders involved in operating and 
participating in the four Maryland TDR programs we used as case studies. The average total transaction 
costs per TDR transaction in all four counties was $19,611 in 2016 dollars. The transaction costs in 
Calvert, Montgomery, and Charles Counties were relatively similar; total transaction costs in St. Mary’s 
County, however, were substantially lower, largely because that county removed the requirement that 
landowners provide a land survey as part of the TDR application process. Table 6 shows our estimates 
of the total transaction costs per TDR transaction in each of the four counties. 
We also calculated the total transaction costs as a percentage of total payment for TDR credits in 
each transaction in each of the four counties. Total transaction costs averaged 17.3% of total payment 
for TDR credits in each transaction across the four counties. This rate was highest (21.2%) in St. Mary's 
County and lowest (12.7%) in Calvert County. The St. Mary’s County TDR program had the lowest 
total transaction costs among the studied programs, but its smaller number of transferred TDR credits 
per transaction means that transaction costs were a higher percent of total payment for TDR credits in 
each transaction. Total transaction costs in Calvert County were the highest among the four counties 
but the higher amount of total payment for TDR credits in each transaction means that transaction costs 
were a lower percentage of total payment in each transaction. 
 
Table 6: Estimates of total transaction costs for interviewed participants in operating/participating in 
four Maryland counties per TDR transaction 
TDR Programs Time-related costs ($) 
Direct monetary 
expenses ($) 
Total transaction 
costs ($) 
Transaction costs as a % 
of payment in each TDR 
transaction 
Calvert County 3,701.80 22,647 26,348.80 12.70 
Montgomery County 5,588.60 19,442 25,030.60 20.50 
St. Mary’s County 3,433.40 1,324 4,757.40 21.20 
Charles County 3,581.80 18,726 22,307.80 14.80 
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Time-related Transaction Costs 
The average total time-related transaction costs per TDR transaction was $4,076 in 2016 dollars 
across the four case studies. The time-related transaction costs in the three TDR programs in Calvert, 
St. Mary’s, and Charles Counties were similar, but the costs in Montgomery County were considerably 
higher. Table 7 presents the estimates of time-related transaction costs involved in operating and 
participating in each TDR program per TDR transaction, as well as the distribution of time-related costs 
across different stakeholders involved in the different stages of the TDR lifecycle. The TDR-creation 
stage involved higher time-related transaction costs in all counties; Montgomery County was the 
exception because the TDR-retirement stage created higher costs. Landowners and program 
administrators incurred the time-related transaction costs involved in creating TDR credits. Collecting 
information and applying for TDR credits were comparatively more time-consuming activities for 
landowners. Landowners also had to pay for the time spent by their land use attorneys in preparing title 
reports, unless developers agreed to cover these costs.  
Program administrators reported that the activities associated with TDR creation were more time-
consuming than tasks in the two other stages. Program administrators spent more of their time in this 
stage consultating with landowners and reviewing TDR applications. Program administrators, 
nevertheless, reported that reviewing a TDR application is a straightforward task unless there is an issue 
with the title report or the mortgage company. The mortgage company can delay the project, since the 
lender needs to sign off on the documents related to land titles. The time-related transaction costs in the 
TDR-creation stage for program administrators in Charles County were comparatively higher. In 
Charles County eligibility and availability of TDR credits vary according to specific soil, size, and 
location criteria while, in other counties, the number of TDR credits available for lands only depends 
on its acreage. 
All respondents reported that they incurred time-related transaction costs in the contracting stage. 
Landowners and developers spent more time during the contracting stage than did program 
administrators because TDR transactions are largely market-based. Research and information collection 
activities were the main components of the time-related transaction costs for all stakeholders, in general, 
and landowners, in particular. Counties normally maintain a list of available TDR credits, as well as 
potential TDR sellers. There is, however, no comparable listing of developers or potential TDR buyers. 
Landowners who were willing to sell their TDR credits were, therefore, often left with no means other 
than ‘word of mouth’ to find TDR buyers. Landowners who were interested in selling their TDR credits 
were uncertain about how long they would have to wait to find a buyer, which might take from a few 
hours/days to a number of months or even years. The waiting time appeared to vary with the local land-
use market. This is a very real cost but one we do not include in calculating policy-related transaction 
costs. The respondents also reported that other activities, which they undertook in the contracting stage, 
such as negotiating a TDR price, preparing a contract, and paying for the TDR credits, were 
straightforward tasks that did not require a large investment of time. 
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Table 7: Estimates of respondents’ time-related transaction costs in operating/participating in four Maryland counties per TDR 
transaction 
TDR 
Programs Stages 
Time associated with each activity by actor 
(hours)* 
Costs of time inputs for each activity by actor 
($) 
Total 
Time-
related 
costs ($) Landowners Developers 
Program 
admins 
Intermediarie
s Landowners Developers 
Progra
m 
admins 
Intermediaries 
Calvert 
County 
TDR Creation 15 0 6 3 342 0 270 1200 1812 
Contracting 16 5 2 0 364.80 500 90 0 954.80 
TDR Retirement 0 8 3 0 0 800 135 0 935 
Total 31 13 11 3 706.80 1300 495 1200 3701.80 
Montgomery 
County 
TDR Creation 18 0 5 3.5 410.40 0 225 1400 2035.40 
Contracting 21 7 2 0 478.80 700 135 0 1313.80 
TDR Retirement 0 17 13 0 0 1700 585 0 2285 
Total 39 24 21 3.5 889.20 2400 945 1400 5588.60 
St. Mary’s 
County 
TDR Creation 14 0 6 3 319.20 0 270 1200 1789.20 
Contracting 14 4 2 0 319.20 400 90 0 809.20 
TDR Retirement 0 7 3 0 0 700 135 0 835 
Total 28 11 11 3 638.40 1100 495 1200 3433.40 
Charles 
County 
TDR Creation 17 0 10 3 387.60 0 450 1200 2037.60 
Contracting 14 4 2 0 319.20 400 90 0 809.20 
TDR Retirement 0 6 3 0 0 600 135 0 735 
Total 31 10 15 3 706.80 1000 675 1200 3581.80 
* The numbers of hours are rounded to the nearest hour 
 
Developers and program administrators also incurred time-related transaction costs in the TDR 
retirement stage. Respondents did not report that most of these activities were very time-consuming; an 
exception was Montgomery County. Interviewees in Calvert, St. Mary’s, and Charles Counties reported 
that the activities, such as recording the contract in the County land record, applying the purchased TDR 
credits to specific development projects, and recording transfer documents, were straightforward and 
not time consuming. Respondents in Montgomery County, in contrast, reported that applying the 
purchased TDR credits to development projects created greater time-related transaction costs. Using 
purchased TDR credits was ‘by right’ in the other three counties. Developers in Montgomery County, 
however, were required to go through lengthy development reviews and consent processes in order to 
use bonus densities derived from purchased TDR credits. They had to negotiate with the County 
Planning Department staff as well as conducting public hearings on the use of purchased TDR credits 
in their proposed development, thereby increasing time-related transaction costs for both developers 
and program administrators in Montgomery County. The significantly higher demand for development 
in Montgomery County, arising from its comparatively large population and close proximity to 
Washington, D.C., probably explains why the County has a more contentious, and thus time-consuming, 
development environment. 
 
Direct Monetary Transaction Costs 
Participating in TDR programs also creates direct monetary transaction costs, the most common 
of which are administration fees, the costs of preparing a land survey, and brokerage fees. Table 8 shows 
our estimates of these costs for each TDR transaction in each TDR case study. The administration fees 
were comparatively low, but other direct monetary transaction costs were sizeable. Landowners paid 
land surveyors, or other agents, between $10,000 – 15,000 for preparing a land survey, where it was 
required (generally when the landowner had not already conducted a survey prior to involving TDR 
transactions). St. Mary’s County removed the requirement that the landowner prepare a land survey in 
order to apply for TDR credits in order to simplify and streamline the TDR administrative process in 
2006.  
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Landowners often used a broker to find a TDR buyer. Respondents reported that the normal 
brokerage commision was approximately 5% of the total payment for TDR credits. Landowners tended 
to involve brokers in TDR transactions when information about available buyers was hard to find, 
usually in less active markets. It was easier and quicker for TDR sellers to find a buyer without a broker 
in more active markets, avoiding brokerage fees. TDR sellers had two choices when there were few 
developments occurring in a county, making demand for TDR credits low - either wait for a positive 
change in market conditions, which might take a long time, or ask a broker to find a potential buyer for 
the TDR credits and pay a commission. Landowners in Montgomery County were more likely to report 
using brokers, as access to information about contacting buyers was more limited and the market was 
less transparent. 
 
Table 8: Estimates of interviewees’ direct monetary expenses involved in participating in four Maryland 
counties per TDR transaction 
TDR Programs Administration fees* ($) 
Costs of preparing 
land survey ($) 
Brokerage 
fees ($) 
Total direct monetary 
expenses ($) 
Calvert County 250 12,000 10,397 22,647 
Montgomery County 350 13,000 6,092 19,442 
St. Mary’s County 200 - 1,124 1,324 
Charles County 200 11,000 7,526 18,726 
* The numbers are rounded 
 
We calculated the brokerage fee as 5% of the average total payment for TDR credits in each 
transaction. We computed the total payment for TDR credits in a typical transaction by multiplying the 
median of transferred TDR credits by the average price of TDR credits. Table 9 presents our estimate 
of total payments for TDR credits in a typical transaction in each county. We also used the median 
number of transferred TDR credits in each TDR case study to remove the effects of outliers in measuring 
central tendency. The median number of transferred credits in St. Mary’s county was the lowest, 
probably because the farms in this county are the smallest of the four counties we studied (US 
Department of Agriculture, 2012). We also calculated the average price of TDR credits, from the date 
when each county’s program was initiated until 2016. The average price of TDR credits varies widely 
in the TDR programs, ranging from $4,332 per TDR credit in Calvert County to $20,306 per TDR credit 
in Montgomery County. The substantial differences are largely due to how each county allocated TDR 
credits, that is, how many credits are created from one acre as demonstrated in Table 3. The different 
counties also had different land values. Montgomery County farms had the highest estimated market 
value (US Department of Agriculture, 2012). Differences in market value have considerable impact on 
the number and value of TDR credits created in each of the four counties. TDR prices have, however, 
substantially fluctuated in the years since these four counties began their TDR programs. Price 
fluctuations can have an impact on the relative significance of transaction costs, since transaction costs 
likely remain relatively more constant than the price of TDR credits. 
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Table 9: Estimates of total payment for TDR credits in a TDR transaction in four Maryland counties 
TDR Programs Median no. of transferred TDR credits per transaction 
Average price of a 
TDR credit* ($) 
Average total payment 
in each transaction ($) 
Calvert County 48 (1979-2014) 4,332 207,936 
Montgomery County 6 (1980-2015) 20,306 121,836 
St. Mary’s County 2 (1990-2015) 11,238 22,476 
Charles County 17 (1992-2013) 8,854 150,518 
Data sources: Administrative records and price/data reported by interviewees 
* Based on 2016 prices 
 
Distribution of Transaction Costs 
We found that private participants, landowners and developers, incurred 84.1% of estimated 
time-related transaction costs and 95.2% of estimated total transaction costs involved in operating and 
participating in TDR programs, on average and across the county programs. Table 10 outlines the 
distribution of transaction costs between private and public participants in the TDR programs in the 
four case counties. TDR transactions are market-based so it is not surprising that the costs appear to fall 
almost entirely on the private sector. Public-sector participants, on the other hand, felt that operating 
TDR programs was more straightforward and less time-consuming than traditional regulatory 
instruments. Program administrators, with whom we spoke, felt that the traditional regulatory 
instruments, such as PDR programs, require more of their time and effort. It is time consuming to collect 
significant information and to successfully negotiate, and make contracts, to purchase development 
rights from landowners in preservation areas. Planners operating traditional regulatory instruments 
decide which farms and lands to preserve and what to pay landowners while, in TDR programs, the 
private market renders these decisions automatic. 
 
Table 10: Distribution of transaction costs between private and public sector respondents 
TDR Programs 
Time-related Transaction Costs Total Transaction Costs 
Private sector Public sector  Private sector Public sector  
$ % $ % $ % $ % 
Calvert County 3206.80 86.60 495 13.40 25,853.80 98.10 495 1.90 
Montgomery County 4643.60 83.10 945 16.90 24,085.60 96.20 945 3.80 
St. Mary’s County 2938.40 85.60 495 14.40 4,262.40 89.60 495 10.40 
Charles County 2906.80 81.20 675 18.80 21,632.80 97.00 675 3.00 
 
Our research shows that, during the years of operation, private sector participants bear the 
overwhelming majority of the transaction costs involved in TDR programs. Our estimates, however, do 
not include the range of transaction costs incurred by the public sector in developing the programs. We 
did not include, for example, the transaction costs involved in activities such as designing and 
establishing relevant policy instruments and enacting enabling legislation, which can be significant. We 
also did not include in our cost estimate any expenses that public-sector participants incur in running 
county planning systems (such as the costs of equipment, accounting fees, etc.), largely because we 
could not obtain reliable data. We did not, at the same time, include comparable private-sector expenses 
either, such as the costs of running a business and making business decisions about development 
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projects. We believe, therefore, that our results are a fair estimate of the comparable transaction costs 
incurred by the public and private sectors while operating and participating in TDR programs in the 
four Maryland counties that served as our case studies. 
This study has some other limitations. We assumed uniform values of time for all people in each 
type of stakeholder group involved in the TDR programs. These values may, in reality, vary widely. 
The hourly cost of developers’/farmers’ time varies, for example, with a number of factors, such as the 
size of the development project/farm, the type of development/farm business, the time of year, and the 
development/farming market in general. We did not conduct a full social cost-benefit analysis but, 
rather, calculated only the financial costs attributable to the stakeholders. We would have, ideally, liked 
to interview the people who completed TDR transactions most recently, but few TDR transactions 
occurred in the case-study counties over the last few years. The low level of activity in TDR markets is 
partly attributable to the effects of the global financial crisis of 2007/8. We have, as a result, interviewed 
some people who completed a transaction several years ago and, thus, our data may be limited by the 
fact that interviewees reported their ‘perceptions after the fact’ (McCann et al., 2005). It was not 
possible to estimate hourly rates based on standardized/official data, rather than self-reported data. The 
results of this study may not be generalizable to other cases but we believe that the estimates of 
transaction costs generated are an interesting start to the debate about the level of transaction costs in 
planning policy instruments and a good starting point for further research on this topic. 
 
Transaction Costs Are Substantial and Distributed Unevenly Among Stakeholders Involved 
TDR programs seek to establish markets for development rights and facilitate a trade between 
landowners and developers; the public policy goal is to protect farmlands, or any areas that a community 
wishes to preserve. TDR programs can provide a win-win situation for both public and private 
participants because they create a market mechanism that: a) allows public-sector planners to promote 
preservation of specific lands without having to expend public funds to purchase that land; b) provides 
compensation to those landowners whose properties are located in designated preservation areas; and 
c) provides developers with another alternative to obtain extra density in designated development areas. 
The activities involved in TDR transfers, or transactions, generate different types of costs; we focused 
on transaction costs. Both the public and private sectors incur transaction costs in TDR programs, that 
is, all the costs involved in a TDR transaction other than the payment for TDR credits. Transaction costs 
include both direct monetary expenses, for example, administration fees, and indirect time-related costs, 
for example, the time participants spend negotiating TDR sale prices. Planners often do not consider 
the existence and magnitude of such transaction costs when designing and implementing policy 
instruments such as TDR programs. 
We show that the transaction costs of operating and participating in TDR programs are sizeable 
and paid largely by the private-sector participants. We do not include, however, the original public-
sector costs incurred in developing the TDR programs because we lack good data. The average total 
transaction costs per TDR transaction, across the four Maryland counties, were $19,611 in 2016 dollars. 
These costs varied, on average, from 13% of total payments for TDR credits per TDR transaction in 
Calvert County to 21% in St. Mary’s County. Private actors incurred 84% of estimated time-related 
transaction costs, and 95% of total estimated transaction costs involved in operating and participating 
in TDR programs. TDR sellers, landowners, tend to bear the largest proportion of such transaction costs. 
Estimated transaction costs might be a small share of the costs that a developer incurs for an entire 
development project. These costs, however, represent a very large share of average farm incomes for 
those selling development rights. Relatively high transaction costs could act as a significant barrier to 
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participating in the TDR process, since transaction costs might considerably lower the net benefits to 
landowners who sell their development rights in a TDR transaction. 
Transaction costs arose from different types of activities. Collecting required information, 
preparing land surveys, and paying brokerage fees, comprised the major transaction costs for 
landowners participating in TDR programs. Brokerage fees were not insignificant; the need for 
brokerage services resulted from insufficient or asymmetric information about TDR buyers. Conducting 
land surveys to apply for TDR credits generated significant costs in three of the four counties; St. Mary’s 
County did not require TDR participants to conduct a land survey, substantially reducing the transaction 
costs for landowners participating in its TDR program. The incidence of such costs in some cases fell 
on the developers rather than the landowners. This varied based on the agreement between TDR sellers 
and buyers.  
Developers whom we interviewed reported that, participating in TDR programs in the three 
counties where TDR credits were allowed by right to obtain bonus densities in development projects, 
was a straightforward activity. The Montgomery County TDR program, however, did not allow 
development by right to obtain bonus densities and, thus, increased the time and effort, and hence 
transaction costs, which developers had to invest in the TDR process. Public officials in the four 
Maryland counties reported that the market-based nature of TDR transactions led to fewer public-sector 
transaction costs; they incurred fewer expenses for administrative activities and information collection 
than they would have if using traditional regulatory instruments, such as PDR programs. 
We found that the various institutional arrangements created different transaction costs and 
distributed them differently among TDR participants. Planners and program administrators should work 
to minimize transaction costs, particularly those borne by the private sector, by designing better 
institutional arrangements and promoting greater transparency in TDR markets. We believe that 
planners should provide more comprehensive information to landowners and developers on TDR 
administrative processes and on TDR prices; planners should play more of the role that brokers now 
play providing up-to-date and accurate information about which landowners have TDR credits to sell 
and which developers are interested in buying TDR credits. Planners should also attempt to simplify 
administrative processes to reduce the private transaction costs associated with TDR programs to 
encourage more private parties to participate in such programs.  
We need additional research to understand if reducing private transaction costs, by requiring 
more public-sector involvement to facilitate market transactions, increases the net social benefits of 
TDR programs relative to alternative instruments such as zoning or PDR programs. We suggest that 
comparing the size of transaction costs, and their distributions among the stakeholders involved, in 
different planning policy instruments, would be a helpful area for future research. We need further 
research on the best ways to lower the total costs of designing, operating, and participating in TDR 
programs and related planning policy instruments. 
Transaction costs affect the efficiency and equity of a TDR program; planners may find that, 
depending on the magnitude and distribution of these costs, the effectiveness of the policy instruments 
they choose to achieve specific land use objectives may be reduced. Proponents of TDR programs, posit 
that, by using the market mechanism, these instruments lead to more efficient and equitable outcomes, 
particularly when compared to traditional regulatory instruments. We do not know, however, if such 
market-based instruments generate fewer or more equitable transaction costs. Neither do we know if 
they better achieve the public-policy goals of planners in terms of addressing the externalities arising 
from land use markets.  
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